The secret note was sent on 11 May 1982, just ten days before British troops landed on the islands, and set out a series of questions for consideration. At the time, the UK was coming under pressure from the Americans to negotiate with the Argentinians, and Armstrong pointed out that it might be possible to make a deal whereby Argentina took over an island some 1300 miles to the east.
“The Argentine claim to South Georgia is relatively recent, our title to it strong,” he said. “It probably does not matter to them politically as much as the Falkland Islands do. They might be prepared to contemplate a deal whereby they kept South Sandwich and we kept South Georgia.”
The note also reveals that Thatcher had been prepared to consider a plan for a post-conflict period of UN administration followed by independence for the islands. Although British public opinion would not accept Argentinian rule at the end of the conflict, the note says, “I think you also believe that it will not be possible for us simply to revert to the status quo ante of colonial status.
“You therefore consider it necessary to think in terms of UN administration or some similar arrangement that could lead to eventual independence”.
Asked to comment, Armstrong pointed out that “these were not options, but questions that the prime minister would need to discuss with ministers.” The note did not “advocate any particular solution,” he said.
At that point, he explained, “the US was trying to promote a negotiated solution. If that was available on acceptable terms, it would obviate the loss of life”. With hindsight, Lord Armstrong said, a deal was “probably not achievable” because neither side would renounce its Falklands claim – but with the US pushing for talks, “a number of questions needed to be discussed.”
In his note, Armstrong suggested asking the chiefs of staff whether they’d need more resources to successfully recapture the islands. “What could be the worst possible outcome... and leave us in the worst position to achieve our objectives in long-term negotiations, would be so to play the hand as plausibly to be held responsible for the failure of diplomatic efforts to get a ceasefire and withdrawal agreement now and then not be able to reposssess the Falkland Islands: to end up either in a stalemate with continuing attrition and casualties (“Gallipoli”) or in a withdrawal,” he wrote.