In today’s Civil Service World, our Policy Focus section tells two very different stories of the Ministry of Defence’s capabilities and its reforms.
On p15, Defence Infrastructure Organisation chief Andrew Manley explains the huge reforms he’s pushing through the ministry’s land and property operations. Under the previous structure, the 7,000-odd staff were dedicated, skilled and closely linked to their fighting forces – but fractured, top-heavy and inefficient. Assisted by what Manley describes as a “remarkably consistent approach from government” – meaning that new defence secretary Phil Hammond hasn’t unpicked the plans made under his predecessor Liam Fox – the reforms are moving fast. They will cost jobs, and reduce local tailoring of services; they may also make life harder for SMEs. But they should create big administration savings, while bringing in new skills and capital to help the MoD get its money’s worth on land disposals and delivery contracts. The forces may get a less bespoke service, but they should appreciate the extra cash.
On p19, meanwhile, we tell the story of the UK’s aircraft carrier purchase. Asked to replace the Ark Royal, the MoD chose a powerful – if not over-engineered – solution: two new British-built carriers, and a fleet of nimble American jets. Then the programme fell foul of the systemic problems afflicting MoD procurement – most obviously, unrealistically optimistic forecasts by programme managers, and delays caused by the MoD’s consequent inability to fit its bulging order book inside its budget.
Labour recognised the problem, and brought in Bernard Grey to plan a solution. Later the coalition – just as it has with the architects of the Treasury’s Operational Efficiency Programme – recruited Grey to implement the reform plans that Labour had commissioned but failed to implement. So like Manley’s reforms, the changes to defence procurement survived a political transition: the coalition’s arrival. The carrier programme, however, did not: in 2010 the PM announced that the delayed, over-budget project would produce just one working carrier, which would be re-engineered to carry a cheaper version of the jet.
Unfortunately, reliable reports suggest that this solution is unworkable: equipping the carrier to take the cheaper jets looks ruinously expensive, if not impossible. Whether the miscalculation lies with the Strategic Defence & Security Review team, the ministry or the ministers, CSW can’t yet say; but whatever happens, more costs and delays look certain.
The MoD is coming from a difficult place, but its operations seem to be improving. DIO is moving fast, and the procurement group at least knows where it wants to get to (it will, says Manley, “probably come along behind” the DIO). So the coalition can claim some credit for continuing and accelerating sensible reforms of the ministry’s capabilities and structures – but unless it also makes the right calls on key management decisions, it’ll squander the potential of those reforms to make our armed forces as powerful and effective as their shrinking budgets permit. ?