A new analysis of central government “delivery units” pioneered by Tony Blair in the early 2000s – then widely adopted around the world – has revealed a mixed picture of success.
The Institute for Government report said that while the creation of units had become a “multi-million pound industry exported around the globe”, examples were “quietly being axed almost as quickly as they were being created”.
While the research flagged up regrets over David Cameron’s 2010 decision to axe Blair’s original Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit – a move reversed two years later, it also pointed to the recent closure of eight other units around the world, with examples in Australia, Chile, Tanzania and Wales.
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Blair’s original PMDU was created within the Cabinet Office in 2001, born out of frustration over departmental shortcomings in delivering Labour Party manifesto commitments in New Labour’s first term of office.
The unit originally focused on tracking and improving performance in priority areas around health, education, security and transport before its remit broadened.
The IfG said Whitehall now had seven delivery units, with the Implementation Unit located in the Cabinet Office and counterparts in six other departments.
New report Tracking Delivery argues that while the delivery model can be effective, key elements need to be in place – including highly visible top-level political backing, and a tightly-controlled remit.
Report author Jen Gold said there were 10 clear warning signs that things were going wrong with a delivery unit, with the unit head being unable to access their political sponsor being top of the list.
Other red lights on the dashboard include units being saddled with a poorly defined mandate, or too many priorities, and having either been set up in a satellite location or moved to one – rather than being based close by to its political master.
Gold said delivery units had become a remarkably popular government innovation with genuinely global appeal, but had failed to live up to political leaders’ expectations in a growing list of countries.
“Delivery units sit alongside a number of innovations – from policy labs to behavioural insights teams – that have captured the interest of governments all over the world,” she said.
“But with delivery units the stakes are generally higher. Weak or ineffective units don’t just represent a waste of resources – their continued existence can cultivate a false sense of security that government projects and programmes are being properly monitored, sometimes with devastating results.”
She added that delivery units could also institutionalise confrontational relationships between centres of governments and line departments.
The report highlighted childhood immunisation in Pakistan’s Punjab province and a dramatic plunge in UK hospital waiting times between 2001 and 2003 as two successes from respective delivery unit initiatives.
The IfG’s 10 delivery-unit warning signs:
• The head of the unit has little, if any, direct access to the political sponsor;
• Stocktake meetings are ad hoc, routinely cancelled and/or responsibility for
chairing them is delegated to another official;
• The unit has a poorly defined mandate, is responsible for tracking too many priorities
or has competing responsibilities that are hard to reconcile (eg policy and delivery);
• The unit is set up in – or moved to – a satellite location, making daily interactions with
the rest of government more difficult and creating the impression that the unit has
limited traction with the political sponsor;
• There is a heavy imbalance between external and internal hires, leaving the unit
either with too few staff members who can understand government and utilise
existing relationships, or with too few “disruptive thinkers” who are able to
challenge the status quo;
• There is a top-heavy organisational structure that constrains day-to-day
operations, such as routine data analysis;
• There are high levels of turnover among staff members and unit heads, meaning
that critical relationships with departments have to be rebuilt continually;
• There is insufficient capacity within the wider delivery system to support the unit’s
data-tracking systems and/or develop good-quality delivery plans;
• There is no leadership coalition outside of the unit taking ownership for the
government’s results agenda; and
• There is a lack of routines in place to review the effectiveness of the unit’s
operations and generate improvement ideas.