If death and taxes are the certainties of everyday life, civil service efficiency must be one of the certainties of government policymaking. Every government tries to find ways to drive efficiencies in the service and so the latest diktat that 15% admin savings need to be found is no surprise (although this is somewhat earlier in the parliamentary cycle than we might usually see such plans). So if every government tries it, surely that suggests that it doesn't work? And what impact is it likely to have on policymaking?
First, it is worth noting that the announcements already try to pre-empt some of the potential criticisms, in particular the pledge that these cuts will not be felt in frontline services. The chancellor, Rachel Reeves, has talked about prioritising nurses, teachers, and police personnel but none of these count in civil service headcount figures. Presumably she would include prison officers and those running the courts as well as those in job centres (who are civil servants) as frontline, which takes a big chunk out of the mix for the two largest departments (MoJ and DWP), and it is hard to see the desire to make a 15% cut at the MoD given the geopolitical situation. Instead the reductions will have to be made in back-office functions – HR, finance, policy advice – so does this mean these areas are likely to feel cuts much greater than 15% in order to reach the overall target or does the target only apply to these areas?
To buy into this plan we need to believe two things: that these areas are already replete with waste so that cuts are painless; or that cuts can be made without negative consequences because of other factors. Nobody serious can believe – given years of austerity – that the civil service is entertaining large numbers of people who are not meaningfully contributing, so we have to assume the second option is driving government thinking.
This means that the work no longer being done by back-office civil servants will either be picked-up by those on the front line (asking them to do more of the routine HR work, for example) or be removed through the magic of improved process, with AI much cited. Previous experiences of asking frontline staff to take on more administrative tasks shows it can work, but it also drives the criticism that frontline staff are form-filling rather than doing their jobs. AI may be the panacea, but surely we should show some caution before we take the leap for services that impact on some of the most vulnerable in society?
Of particular concern is the impact on policy advice. Our work shows that the best policymaking is cooperative, iterative, and thinks long-term. This requires resources but leads to better outcomes with the obvious corollary that alternative approaches may be cheaper but lead to worse outcomes. Maybe ministers have fallen into the trap of assuming the fairly small number of people they engage with regularly (generally senior civil servants) are the only ones doing any work. Any senior official worth their salt knows how much they rely on the hard work of their team.
If you take away that broader structure of policy development then you have to accept that the officials in the room are going to be less able to support ministers. We can joke that “Yes, Minister!” needs to become “I don’t have a clue, Minister!” but actually the bigger risk is that officials do not own their ignorance because they have a reputation to maintain. Perhaps ministers think they can rely more on think tanks but we have to be clear that think tanks have their own political agendas, are not transparent, and don’t have access to all the information the government does.
Ultimately the issue that is not addressed in this approach is whether ministers are prepared to lower their ambition for what can be done. Will they stop important programmes and be prepared for work to simply stop rather than be wound-down well (which also takes resources)? Our experience of multiple government efficiency drives suggests this is the hardest piece of the puzzle to solve.
We are not against the idea of looking for more efficient ways of working and we should all be prepared to embrace new approaches and new technology. But if these ideas are not rooted in how to develop and implement the best policies for the country, then experience suggests arbitrary targets will drive entirely the wrong outcomes.
Nansi Ellis and Gareth Conyard are the authors of Improving Education Policy Together. Conyard is chief executive of the Teacher Development Trust and a former senior civil servant in the Department for Education. Ellis is an education policy consultant and former assistant general secretary for the National Education Union