Over the last couple of weeks, permanent secretaries have been receiving phone calls from Labour shadow secretaries of state to arrange secret meetings to discuss post-election plans. The access talks – which originated 50 years ago in the days of Alec Home and Harold Wilson – have developed into a regular part of the pre-election scene. But they are shrouded in secrecy and ambiguity – inevitably, since they involve senior civil servants going behind the backs of current ministers to talk to Opposition shadows.
Permanent secretaries do try to arrange meetings to minimise the risk of embarrassment to current ministers: like illicit love affairs, assignations are arranged away from the department – often in the bustle of the Palace of Westminster. Yet while incumbent ministers accept the need for such pre-election contacts – and have generally benefited from such meetings themselves before entering government – they instinctively dislike them and want them to be as limited as possible. David Cameron ensured that contacts did not start until early October, just seven months before polling day. This is half the time permitted in 2009-10, and less than the 10-12 months recommended by the Institute for Government.
These meetings are designed to compensate for the sudden way that governments change in Britain – usually on the day after voting and, even when coalition talks were required in 2010, only five days later. This contrasts with the gradual transitions even in many countries with parliamentary systems, let alone the ten weeks in the USA. It also contrasts with what happens at the top of almost any other organisation, where new leaders have a run-in period.
The access talks are only a partial substitute for a longer handover, but they’re better than nothing. They are, in essence, about relationship-building – so a prospective secretary of state and a permanent secretary can establish at least a basic understanding of each other. Such is the turnover on frontbenches, even in the brief time since Labour was last in power, that many shadows have little understanding of how Whitehall works, let alone of the substantial changes within many departments since 2010.
The meetings take place under tight conventions, in order to retain the confidence of incumbent secretaries of state. Civil servants may neither discuss the policies of their current ministers, nor comment on the policy proposals of the Opposition. The official guidance, now as in 2010, is that civil servants should be in listening mode. They can answer factual questions about the department, its organisation and budgets, but nothing beyond that.
The real benefit of the meetings is to alert the civil service to Opposition plans for immediate action after an election. All governments like to make an early impact, and this way civil servants can be prepared to draft an announcement or new Bill.
The IfG has argued that the guidance needs to be clarified to allow discussion of the potential challenges around implementing Opposition proposals, and to take account of ministers and programmes which are sited in two departments. But the guidance looks unlikely to be changed at present, leaving a degree of ambiguity. So while officials aren’t allowed to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of an Opposition policy, they have sometimes felt able to raise questions. How fast do you want to introduce this policy? Does it require legislation, or joint working with other departments? How far the discussions broaden out largely depends on personal relationships.
In two reports which Dr Catherine Haddon and I produced on transitions for the IfG, in 2009 and 2011, we identified several examples where pre-election contacts had allowed new ministers to get to grips with their new posts rapidly and effectively. In 1997, pre-election contacts permitted an early start on the introduction of the numeracy and literacy hours in schools, as well as the Youth Justice Board in the Home Office. In 2010, similar contacts allowed the Treasury to move quickly to set up the Office for Budget Responsibility and to prepare for an early package of in-year spending cuts.
However, it would be wrong to exaggerate the value of such contacts. They can really only help new governments achieve their immediate priorities. For far-reaching and radical plans, it is better to wait until a new government is in office, when full advice can be given.
Moreover, the shadow secretary of state who’s met a particular permanent secretary may not win a job in that department. Incoming PMs often shuffle their top teams, reflecting performance during the campaign and because some politicians are better in opposition than in government. In 2010, there were further changes because of the creation of the coalition. In these cases, outgoing shadows may not fill in their successors, leaving the new secretary of state and permanent secretary starting from scratch. One way of minimising such disruption is for the Opposition to co-ordinate their contacts and share information amongst themselves.
The potential gain from the access talks is greater mutual trust between new ministers and civil servants, and a new government getting off to a strong start.